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COORDINATION FAILURES, CLUSTER THEORY AND 







  1. Introduction 
 
Development  policy  has  been  energized  in  the  last  decades  by  a  number  of 
contributions emphasizing a new positive role the state can and should play in fostering 
economic growth. The central pillar of this literature is Michael Porter and his theory of 
clusters. In a few words, a cluster is a bundle of industries that gain in efficiency through 
co-location. After the publication of Porter (1990), this author has quickly become the 
foremost advocate of industrial policy of our times, arguing that clusters should be central 
to any competitiveness agenda. Porter’s influence is phenomenal throughout the world.
1 
He  is  a  “guru”  of  economic  development,  “spiritual  father”  of  numerous  research 
institutes, cluster initiatives and projects, and advisor for economic development policy in 
many  countries.  In  Europe  in  particular,  where  governments  are  more  prone  to  a 
centralized  development  strategy,  clusters  have  become  increasingly  an  objective  of 
economic policy.
2 
The  cluster  theory  –  reflecting  the  professional  formation  if  its  author  as 
management  strategist  –  underlines  the  gains  expected  to  accrue  from  the  regional 
concentration of related industries and makes the normative statement that governments 
should boost the development of clusters. Whatever its influence on policymakers across 
the world, the theory lacked any positive explanation about the necessity of government 
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intervention  in  the  natural  functioning  of  the  market.
3  Emphasizing  the  merits  of 
industrial agglomeration, it did not provided an answer to the essential question: could 
not these benefits be obtained on a free market, in the absence of any interference of the 
government?  Does  the  potential  existence  of  cluster  benefits  validate  the  common 
sugestion that countries should promote regional development through cluster policies? 
  A  number  of  economists  have  attempted  to  anchor  the  appetite  for  clustering 
initiatives  in  solid  theoretical  bedrock.  They  have  pointed  out  an  interesting  market 
failure that may prevent the emergence of profitable clusters and thus jeopardize overall 
economic development: the failure of individuals to coordinate changes in their actions in 
order to reap the benefits of a better situation.
4 Although the literature on coordination 
problems has a long tradition,
5 only recently it has become concerned with the relation 
between  this  supposed  type  of  market  failure  and  the  alleged  benefits  of  industrial 
agglomeration. Economists like Rodrik (2004) and Rodriguez-Clare (2005a; 2005b) have 
used this particular market failure argument as justification for a porterian-style “new 
industrial policy”, the goal of which is to induce entrepreneurs to invest in those projects 
with the highest social return. 
As the coordination externality argument goes, many investment projects require 
simultaneous investments in complementary production processes. Firms can improve 
their performance if entrepreneurs realize that their individual success is dependent on the 
actions  of  other  market  participants.  They  can  get  organized  to  identify  common 
challenges, for example that all companies would profit from a specific training program 
at the local university, from an investment in improving transport facilities, or from a 
joint effort to upgrade the local power or water supply. For an individual company it 
would not make sense to address such issues but for the group as a whole they become 
hugely beneficial efforts. Put it differently, the social rate of return on investments in key 
projects  is  higher  than  the  pure  private  return.  This  means  that  coordination  will  be 
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under-supplied  and  that  government  should  correct  market  failure,  providing  proper 
incentives in order to reach the optimal level of coordination.  
  This paper intends to provide a refutation of the idea that coordination failures as 
manifested in the inability of clusters to emerge can serve as a ground for government 
intervention. It uses mainly Porter, Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare thesis as an example of 
this approach and criticizes the claim that coordination externalities prevent the market 
process to allocate resources optimally. In our view, such an essay is important given that 
in  the  last  years  the  experimentation  of  various  cluster  policies  has  intensified 
considerably. Indeed, one grave lesson that can be drawn from the existing literature on 
clusters is that discussion of alternative cluster policies has eclipsed the cluster theory. 
People stopped asking questions about the meaning of cluster and started to exercise 
various cluster policies instead. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the coordination 
failure argument which pushes the case for industrial policy, with a focus on the relation 
between coordination problems and Porter’s theory of clusters. Section three presents the 
policy prescriptions advanced in the new development economics literature. Section four 
provides a critical analysis of the coordination failure-based development economics. It 
explains at the outset the role of entrepreneurs in achieving coordination on a free market. 
Then, it criticizes the notion of coordination failure and underscores the weaknesses of 
cluster theory, explaining the risks associated with attempts to build clusters. Section six 
explains  why  the  new  argument  of  market  imperfection  fails  to  support  the  case  for 
industrial policy. The last section concludes the paper.  
   
2. From coordination failure to cluster policy 
 
As  Anderson  et  al.  (2004,  pp.  48-49)  acknowledges,  the  foremost  motive  for 
pursuing cluster policies derives from a supposed market failure in achieving economic 
coordination. The best explanation of this market failure is provided by Rodriguez-Clare 
(2005) and Rodrik (2004). The former author (p. 3) points out the fact that the success or 
failure  of  an  action  depends  upon  the  context  in  which  it  is  undertaken:  “A  firm’s 
productivity depends not only on its own efforts and abilities, and on general economic   4
conditions (e.g., the macroeconomic environment and the legal system), but also on the 
actions of other firms, infrastructure, regulation and other public goods”. 
On a more specific note, Rodrik (pp. 12-13) notes that 
“Many projects require simultaneous, large-scale investments to be made 
in order to become profitable. […] An individual producer contemplating 
whether to invest in a greenhouse needs to know that there is an electrical 
grid  he  can  access  nearby,  irrigation  is  available,  the  logistics  and 
transport  networks  are  in  place,  qurantine  and  other  public  health 
measures have been taken to protect his plants from his neighbors’ pests, 
and his country has been marketed abroad as a dependable supplier of 
highquality orchids. All of these services have high fixed costs, and are 
unlikely to be provided by private entities unless they have an assurance 
that there will be enough greenhouses to demand their services in the first 
place.  This  is  a  classic  coordination  problem.  […]  More  generally, 
coordination  failures  can  arise  whenever  new  industries  exhibit  scale 
economies and some of the inputs are non-tradable (or require geographic 
proximity).” 
The  attempt  to  relate  the  observation  that  any  action’s  result  depends  on  the 
specific environment in which it is performed to the theory of externalities is problematic. 
As  we  will  try  to  demonstrate,  interpreting  the  coordination  problem  in  the  light  of 
externalities theory is questionable. Potential weaknesses in the argumentation can pave 
the ground for mistaken policy recommendations. Before checking the line of reasoning 
for errors it is necessary to put the issue in a proper perspective. 
As Howitt (2001, pp. 3-4) argues, the coordination effort market participants put 
depends  critically  on  their  expectation  that  other  individuals  will  act  to  take  full 
advantage of potential gains from trade: “When people on one side of a market put more 
effort into the matching process, this makes it more worthwhile for those on the other 
side  to  do  the  same  thing,  because  it  makes  transacting  less  costly  for  them.”  For 
example,  pessimistic  expectations  on  the  part  of firms  that  they  can  find  appropriate 
workers will make more costly for workers to find suitable jobs. A vicious circle seems to 
ensue, keeping the market at distance from an efficient allocation of resources.   5
Following  a  similar  line  of  reasoning,  Marshall  (p.  13-14)  provides  a  good 
explanation of what is meant by coordination failure: 
“Suppose  the  economic  performance  of  a  country  (or  a  firm, 
industry, or financial market) depends on large numbers of investors being 
willing to provide funds. If it is generally believed that other investors will 
withhold  funds,  it  is  rational  for  any  given  investor  to  refrain  from 
investing.  Thus,  these  beliefs  become  self-fulfilling.  This  represents  a 
coordination failure because everyone would be better off if all investors 
provided funds to the affected country. Unfortunately, there is no way to 
coordinate investor actions in this way.” 
More  precisely,  under  the  circumstances  described  above,  there  are  multiple 
equilibria: a good equilibrium, obtained when entrepreneurs have optimistic expectations 
and thus manage to coordinate their businesses, and a bad equilibrium, resulting from 
entrepreneurs’  reluctance  to  invest  and  their  failure  to  coordinate.  When  the  market 
mechanism does not work, the government should coordinate (stimulate) entrepreneurs 
into the good equilibrium.  
This policy prescription echoes the arguments of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
Hirschman  (1958)  who  argued  for  the  necessity  of  a  massive  and  concentrated 
industrialization  policy  (“big  push”  strategy)  in  order  to  break  the  underdevelopment 
equilibria. In light of the negative consequences of industrialization policy carried out by 
many developing countries in the 1960s and 1960s, market failure theorists are cautious, 
and insist that the solution requires skill rather than resources (Hoff, 2000). Essentially, 
the government should adopt policies that rein in the spillovers among entrepreneurs, 
paving  the  way  for  the  good  equilibrium.  Since  many  spillovers  are  local  in  nature, 
geographical considerations should play an important role in the political recipe. 
  The  coordination  externality  argument  can  be  associated  with  Porter’s  (1990; 
1998a;  1998b;  2000)  idea  that  clusters,  that  is,  regionally  coordinated  industries,  are 
critical  for  overall  economic  growth.
6  Clusters  are  defined  as  collection  of  related 
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activities and industries that have managed to overcome the problem of coordination.
7 
“As the cluster develops it becomes a mutually reinforcing system where benefits flow 
backwards and forwards throughout the industries in the cluster.” (LeVeen, 1998). 
Clusters arise because companies are stimulated to locate near one another to take 
advantage from the existence of a variety of external effects. The literature emphasizing 
these externalities is considerable.
8 The basic reason for clustering is the minimization of 
transportation and communication costs. Also, geographical proximity gives companies 
the possibility to access a large pool of suppliers (including skilled workforce) and thus 
reduce  search  costs,  which  positively  impacts  productivity.  In  addition,  industrial 
agglomeration facilitates the flow of tacit knowledge among firms (Desrochers, 2001), 
creating  an  “environment  of  learning”,  and  allowing  companies  to  more  efficiently 
acquire  “know-how”  and  accelerate  innovation.  More  generally,  “agglomeration 
fundamentally  serves  to  increase  the  opportunities  for  exchange  and  to  reduce  the 
incidence of missing markets” (Gordon and McCann, 2000, p. 518).
9 This perspective is 
supported by Porter (1998), who argued that “being part of a cluster allows companies to 
operate  more  productively  in  sourcing  inputs;  accessing  information,  technology,  and 
needed institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating 
improvement.” 
The normative implication of the agglomeration effects argument is that the state 
should promote the formation of clusters. In Porter’s view, “clusters should represent an 
important  component  of  state  and  local  economic  policy”  (Porter  2000,  p.  29.). 
Alternatively, one can use cluster-based policy as a tool to remove the imperfections of 
the free market by facilitating the coordination of economic agents: “Clusters provide 
opportunities for microeconomic interventions that promote coordination” (Rodriguez-
Clare 2005, p. 3). Consequently, the  government should promote the development of 
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clusters by inducing entrepreneurs to invest in those projects that offer high spillover 
effects.  
This  new  ground  for  industrial  policy  has  found  an  increasing  number  of 
supporters among policymakers throughout the world. According to Danson and Whittam 
(1999), “Many areas around the developed world are adopting the clusters approach to 
regional economic regeneration, with the United Kingdom-wide government Department 
of Trade and Industry suggesting that this could be a key element in re-establishing the 
competitiveness of national businesses in the future.” 
At the present, the opinion that clusters can play an important role in fostering 
industrial development is widely held among development strategists and government 
consultants.
10 All international economic organizations – OECD, the World Bank, IMF, 
UNIDO  and  UNCTAD  –  are  engaged  in  sponsoring  research,  evaluation  and 
development  of  cluster  or  cluster  policies  throughout  the  world.
11  Under  the  label  of 
“cluster  policy”  public  authorities  actively  encouraged  the  establishment  of  “science 
parks”,  “business  incubators”,  “(eco-)industrial  parks”,  “industrial  districts”,  “targeted 
recruitment”,  “enterprise  zones”,  “foreign  trade  zones”,  “centers  of  expertise”,  and  a 
large variety of other economic experiments designed to enhance industrial concentration 
and cooperation. 
 
3. Coordination and government intervention 
 
How is government supposed to improve the coordination of market participants? 
As Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 30) argues, “One interesting approach would be for the 
government to create a mechanism whereby business associations representing different 
clusters  would  submit  proposals  that  identify  areas  for  collective  action  and  public 
support. The different proposals would be reviewed by a “panel of experts,” who would 
rank them according to the estimated social return for the public investment. Finally, the 
best projects would be selected for support.” 
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The proponents of the new industrial policy are aware that past interventionism 
has failed systematically to promote growth and prosperity all over the world, and they 
are very cautious to differentiate their opinions about market failure from the older view 
of government’s superiority.
12 Porter (2000, p. 27) argues that “a role for government 
cluster development and upgrading should not be confused with the notion of industrial 
policy” and that “the intellectual foundations of cluster theory and industrial policy are 
fundamentally  different, as  are  their  implications  for  government  policy.”  Rodriguez-
Clare (2005, p. 29-30) holds a similar opinion, maintaining that “if one wanted to call the 
current proposal a sort of industrial policy, it would be a “soft” industrial policy, rather 
than  the  “hard”  industrial  policy  implemented  in  previous  decades,  which  entailed 
distorting prices so as to reallocate resources to certain sectors as a way to generate a new 
pattern of comparative advantage […] This is important because soft policies are likely to 
be more transparent and less costly.” Likewise, referring to the manner in which various 
industrial  projects  are  to  be  evaluated  by  government  officials,  Rodrik  (2004,  p.  27) 
appreciates that “Proposals need to be made public, formally analyzed and evaluated by 
technocrats, and their fiscal impact costed out.” 
According to the proponents of the new industrial policy, the government should 
shift  the  attention  from  individual  firms  and  industries  to  clusters.  Rodriguez-Clare 
(2005, p. 28) points out that unlike the old strategy, which attempted to pick winners (that 
is, individual companies), “policy should pick clusters”, and Porter complements this 
arguing  that  instead  of  targeting  specific  clusters,  all  existing  and  emerging  clusters 
deserve attention. 
In spite of its popularity among economists and policymakers, the case for the 
new  industrial  policy  cannot  be  taken  for  granted.  In  particular,  the  idea  that 
interdependencies among market participants prevent an optimal allocation of resources, 
as well as the policy recommendation based on it, should be considered carefully. 
 
4. Issues to consider with cluster theory 
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A number of considerations prompt us to claim that coordination-based model of 
market failure in development does not enrich the understanding of how entrepreneurship 
contributes to development, is unrealistic and internally inconsistent. In what follows, we 
will analyze some of its weaknesses closely. 
 
4.1. Entrepreneurship and coordination 
 
The proponents of coordination failure argument provide a very simple definition 
of coordination. In their view, coordination problems typically arise when “profitable 
new industries fail to develop unless upstream and downstream investments are coaxed 
simultaneously” (Rodrik 2004, p. 13). For example, “building an airport in a region that 
has no hotels would not lead to any traffic, but hotels without a regional airport may not 
be profitable either” (Rodriguez-Clare, 2005, p. 10). 
This view of coordination may be considered as simply a truism. If a successful 
investment occurs, it is profitable because it is properly integrated into a network of 
complementary businesses. Inversely, any investment failure brings a loss because it does 
not fit in a suitable network of complementary businesses. 
In  this  perspective,  coordination  is  conceived  as  a  technological  problem. 
Coordination is achieved whenever a group of complementary investments are set up 
simultaneously.  But  technological  complementarity  does  not  lead  automatically  to 
economic  efficiency.  Usually,  there  are  several  (possibly  many)  technological 
possibilities  of  producing  a  given  good,  and  a  lot  more  possibilities  of  producing 
complementary goods. To take the above-mentioned example, various types of hotels 
operate with various degrees of profitability if transportation is available via railroad, 
highway or airport. And one cannot predict that simultaneous investments in building 
hotels and transportation will be profitable. 
Alternatively,  coordination  can  be  viewed  not  as  a  problem  of  technical 
complementarity/compatibility  between  different  economic  units,  or  as  a  problem  of 
synchronization  of  producers,  but  as  a  relation  between  producers  and  consumers. 
Following Mises (1998), we should consider coordination as the result of entrepreneurial 
actions.  The  market  process  effectively  coordinates  productive  efforts  because  the   10 
structure of prices is shaped according to the relative importance of resources for their 
final users – the consumers.
13 More precisely, by forecasting future market conditions, 
entrepreneurs bid for resources in an attempt to increase investments in those production 
processes with the highest expected rate of return, that is, resulting in the output of those 
goods  consumers  need  most.  Thus,  because  the  prices  for  factors  of  production  are 
continuously adjusted to the expected prices of final goods, the emerging constellation of 
prices  coordinates  the  various  uses  of  resources and  result  in  a  coherent  structure  of 
production. 
The essential instrument used by entrepreneurs in deciding upon the allocation of 
resources is monetary calculation. If their undertaking ends with a profit, then it means 
that resources were brought in line with consumers’ needs. If the result is a loss, then 
inputs  were  diverted  from  their  optimal  employment  and  wasted  into  less  important 
production  processes.  Investors  and  producers  are  stimulated  to  coordinate  their 
businesses in order to respond to consumption demand. On a free market, production is 
rational and coherent, always subordinated to consumers’ wishes. 
Besides adopting an inadequate perspective on coordination, the market failure 
argument is unfeasible on its own grounds. In the next sections we explore in more detail 
some of its shortcomings.
14  
 
4.2 The fallacy of coordination failure 
 
Rodriguez-Clare  (2005,  p.  4)  starts  his  difficult  way  into  the  externalities 
argument by maintaining that “investment by one firm can have a positive effect on the 
profitability of investment by other firms, because higher investment gives rise to an 
increase in aggregate demand, which under economies of scale increases profitability of 
investment elsewhere in the economy”.
15 Yet why does investment itself enhance the 
profitability of all the other projects? At a closer look, it seems obvious that a particular 
                                                            
13 An excellent description of the coordinative property of the market process can be found in Salerno 
(1991). 
14 We prefer to let aside the general weaknesses of the theory of externalities and public goods – which 
have been comprehensively analyzed by Block (1983), Hoppe (1989), Hummel (1990) and Holcombe 
(1997) – and focus instead on the particular case of coordination externalities. 
15 Yehoue (2005, p. 5) advances a similar argument.    11 
investment can have a negative, as well as a positive impact on other businesses. For 
example,  the  decision  to  build  a  bridge  will  promote  road  transportation  but  will 
necessarily undermine shipping businesses. It is not clear how an investment is good for 
society  simply  because  it  has  beneficial  implications  on  certain  other  entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
Suppose that I am contemplating the possibility of building a fancy restaurant. 
Following Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare, there are multiple equilibria. On the one hand, if 
I intend to locate my restaurant in the middle of a future poor neighbourhood, there are 
few chances that the restaurant will operate profitable. On the other hand, if I intend to 
situate my business in what is going to become a rich residential area, then probably it 
will attract many customers and the restaurant will prove a good investment. Obviously, 
in the latter situation, the restaurant will integrate successfully in the community; my 
investment  in  opening  the  restaurant  will  be  consistent  with  the  potential  customers’ 
decision to inhabit the same region. But, as the authors object, one can never be sure that 
this (good) equilibrium will actually occur, because potential customers do not know 
about my intention to build the restaurant, and, in turn, I do not know about how many of 
them intend to live in my neighbourhood. Cautious individuals may choose not move in, 
even though in the opposite case all of us would be better of and coordination achieved. 
So,  why  not  convince  the  government  to  make  the  rich  people  move  in  the 
neighbourhood?  Thus,  coordination  will  be  much  easier  to  accomplish!  The  fact  that 
nobody  will  find  this  idea  reasonable  is  sufficient  proof  that  the  coordination  failure 
argument proves far too much. In addition, the argument is silent about the fate of the 
individuals  who  actually  live  in  my  neighbourhood.  When  potential  restaurant’s 
customers  are  moved  in,  the  present  inhabitants  are  moved  out.  It  is  clear  that  this 
dislocation creates its own problems. But the advocates of state intervention overlook the 
discoordination resulted from this forced coordination.  
Another point in the coordination failure argument is that coordination is costly. 
As Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 6) explains: 
“One  can  think  of  a  similar  story  to  the  one  above,  where 
coordination failures arise between workers thinking about investing in 
training and  firms thinking about investing in technologies that require   12 
trained workers […] Although a firm can contract with a worker so that 
they both invest in training and technology, and split the realized surplus, 
a problem arises because of the risk of separation. At that point, the firm 
would have to look for a trained worker, and the trained worker has to 
look  for  a  job  in  a  firm  with  modern  technology.  Given  search  costs, 
however, there is a risk that a productive match will not materialize, in 
which case firms and workers will have lost their investment.” 
The  thesis  that  search  costs  undermines  entrepreneurial  coordination  is 
misleading. There is no such thing as cost-free action. Search costs, like transportation 
costs or labor costs are economic costs which must be taken into account before deciding 
upon the allocation of resources. The fact that the height of search costs discourages 
some action is no more relevant that the fact that high transportation costs prevents a 
doctor from selling his services to a distant customer. If we pursue the argument to its 
logical conclusion, we will maintain that this is a good reason for state subsidization of  
the doctor’s distant activity. But this is hardly acceptable. Therefore, it is obvious that 
one cannot derive any sound conclusion by  comparing  real world situations with the 
(perfect competition-based) model of Rodrik, where search is costless. 
Further, search costs cannot be eliminated through state action, they can only be 
transferred  onto  other  people.  The  government  has  to  incur  itself  some  search  costs 
(associated with the implementation of cluster development strategies), and covers them 
through taxation. A natural question then is why are these costs more important than 
taxation? In the absence of a scientific answer, the sensible economist is encouraged to 
regard with caution the enthusiastic claims of coordination failure theorists and clusters’ 
advocates.
16 
Considerations  about  the  confusing  nature  of  coordination  failure  arguments 
represent, however, only part of the story in the critique of modern development policy. 
We will turn now to the flaws in the case for clustering initiatives.  
 
4.3 The irrelevance of cluster concept 
                                                            
16 Indeed, in their imaginative scenarios of cluster development strategies development economists seem to 
rely on little more than statist presupositions and popular dogma about market failure.   13 
 
Let us focus first on the (lack of) significance of the cluster notion. Clusters are 
often seen as successful attempts to overcome coordination failures. According to Porter 
(1998, p. 226), “a cluster is a form of network that occurs within a geographical location, 
in which the proximity of firms and institutions ensures certain forms of commonality 
and increases the frequency and impact of interactions”. From the very beginning, it is 
important to note the vagueness of this definition. As Martin and Sunley (2003, p. 10) 
emphasize, 
“the obvious problem raised by these cluster definitions is the lack of clear 
boundaries, both industrial and geographical. At what level of industrial 
aggregation  should  a  cluster  be  defined,  and  what  range  of  related  or 
associated industries and activities should be included? How strong do the 
linkages between firms have to be? How economically specialized does a 
local concentration of firms have to be to constitute a cluster? […] At 
what  spatial  scale,  and  over  what  geographical  range,  do  clustering 
processes (inter-firm linkages, knowledge spillovers, rivalry, business and 
social networks, and so on) operate? What spatial density of such firms 
and their interactions defines a cluster?” 
The fuzzy meaning of the cluster concept has been referred to by various analysts 
as part of the intentional style of Porter, who seeks to provide policymakers with an 
argument for exercising interventionism. Porter’s idea serves as basis for a redefinition of 
interventionist  policy,  following  the  obvious  intellectual  bankruptcy  of  the  old  (rude 
keynesian) macroeconomic policy and price interventionism. It provides the ground for a 
more refined, intellectual-appealing interventionism.
17 The definitional elasticity of the 
cluster concept undermines the operationality of the theory while simultaneously making 
it an ideal tool for politicians. As Porter (1998, p. 102) himself admits, “drawing cluster 
boundaries  is  often  a  matter  of  degree,  and  involves  a  creative  process  informed  by 
understanding the most important linkages and complementarities across industries and 
institutions to competition.” This can only mean that the exact shape of clusters is related 
                                                            
17 As Martin and Sunley (2003, p. 12) observe, the notion of cluster can be used in a variety of situations, 
“depending on what the aim of the exercise is, or the client or policymaker for whom the analysis is 
intended.”   14 
to  the  discretionary  choice  of  policymakers.  Any  attempt  to  circumscribe  a  group  of 
related  companies  based  upon  a  certain  criterion  runs  the  danger  of  overlooking 
important clusters; at the same time, too many firms might be selected and clusters can be 
loosely defined. 
The  policy  recommendation  concerning  the  promotion  of  clusters  overlooks 
important  economic  insights.  First  of  all,  the  formation  of  clusters  enhances  the 
productivity of individuals only if it springs naturally from the voluntary actions of the 
producers.  To  say  that  a  higher  agglomeration  of  firms  (at  the  extreme,  a  single 
comprehensive  cluster)  encourages  unconditionally  the  deepening  of  specialization, 
development  of  trade,  promotes  innovation  and  supports  an  increasing  of  economic 
growth,  is  to  treat  mechanistically  human  actions.  It  is  true  that  cluster  formation 
decreases  some  economic  costs,  because  businessmen  do  not  have  to  incur  the  same 
expenditures with transportation and search costs. But following similar reasoning, an 
extension of the number of producers on the market – that is, a deepening of the division 
of  labor  –  increases  search  costs.  Yet,  as  it  is  absurd  to  consider  that  agglomeration 
promotes society’s welfare just because, by decreasing transportation and search costs, it 
simplifies trade and production, it is no more reasonable to assume that industrial clusters 
bring  an  increasing  of  welfare.  Individuals  do  not  wish  unconditionally  to  avoid 
transaction  costs  by  eliminating  the  distance  among  them.  Beyond  a  certain  level, 
increased agglomeration does not result in net positive external benefits, but in negative 
externalities.  An  important  question  for  the  entrepreneur  deciding  the  location  of  its 
venture is whether agglomeration benefits are higher than congestion costs. The issue 
cannot  be  settled  by  an  independent  observer,  because  respective  benefits  and  costs 
cannot be determined objectively. Therefore, the optimal density of investments can be 
discerned only by entrepreneurial judgement of market conditions. 
It is difficult to prove empirically that clustering is by necessity beneficial. Rather, 
as history illustrates, people prefer to spread even if, as a consequence of their choice, the 
transportation  expenses  increase.  On  a  free  market,  entrepreneurs  will  try  to  respond 
accurately to the demands of their customers, providing goods in the locations preferred 
by the public. Therefore, only on a free market would it be possible to discover what is 
the optimal size or the proper shape of a firm or cluster. Since political action is not a   15 
substitute  for  voluntary  cooperation,  the  merits  of  a  discretionary  intervention  on  the 
organization of production are highly questionable. 
Territorial industrial agglomerations spring from entrepreneurs’ undertakings. In 
other  words,  the  characteristics  of  a  cluster  are  the  outcome  of  speculative  actions. 
Consequently,  not  all  clusters  spur  the  competitiveness  of  their  members.  There  are 
examples of cluster failures.
18 Businesses cluster together when entrepreneurs deem this 
decision to have a positive impact on their profits. In the opposite the case, industries will 
decide to remove their production units to new places. A number of factors can explain 
the decision of companies to disband a cluster: traffic congestion, increase in the price of 
land or labor, technological isomorphism and the risk of over-specialization (Martin and 
Sunley 2003, p. 27). Put it shortly, “Clusters dissolve when costs become too high for 
industries to remain competitive” (Buss 1999, p. 368). In fact, the point that clusters do 
not necessarily increase the competitiveness of member firms is acknowledged by Porter 
himself, when he states: “When a cluster shares a uniform approach to competing, a sort 
of groupthink often reinforces old behaviors, suppresses new ideas, and creates rigidities 
that prevent adoption of improvements.  Clusters also might not support truly radical 
innovation, which tends to invalidate the existing pools of talent, information, suppliers, 
and  infrastructure.  In  these  circumstances,  a  cluster  participant….might  suffer  from 
greater  barriers  to  perceiving  the  need  to  change…”    (Porter  2000,  p.  24,  emphasis 
added.)  
Clusters represent a form of industrial organization. It results from the uncessant 
attempt of entrepreneurs to arrange the structure of production so as to fulfill to the best 
extent possible the consumers’ demands. Therefore, clusters are specific consequences of 
entrepreneurial ventures.
19 As Feldman and Francis (2004, p. 130) observes, “the process 
of cluster development is neither linear nor fully predictable.” The actual statistical image 
of a cluster reflects past businesses relationships and cannot serve as an indication of its 
                                                            
18  See,  for  example,  Chapman  (2005).  The  reluctance  to  accept  this  perspective  has  serious  practical 
consequences. As Bresnahan, Gambardella and Saxenian (2001, p. 7) note, “Many governments have made 
the analytical error of focusing far too much on the second aspect of external effects, and have viewed 
clusters of innovative activity as no more than a ticket to producer rents. This has provided the intellectual 
foundation for largely failed policies that attempt to jump-start growth in clusters by directive policy.”  
19 “Clustering is the result of entrepreneurial activity and is driven by the production of valued goods to 
seize profits. Governments cannot therefore supersede the market in the creation of clusters.” (Desrochers 
and Sautet 2004, p. 238-239).   16 
future evolution. Government meddling with clusters is tantamount to interference in the 
entrepreneurial  process  by  which  resources  are  directed  toward  the  fulfillment  of  the 
market participants’ most urgent needs. It introduces artificial incentives that weaken the 
inherent coordinative quality of market incentives.
20 
Instead of reasoning in terms of “externalities” and “market failure”, it is time for 
mainstream  economists  to  realize  that  government  is  a  substantive  source  of 
entrepreneurial discoordination. Through its trade policy – imposing different regulations 
and  technical  specifications,  customs  duties,  quotas,  voluntary  export  adjustments  – 
immigration laws, regulations concerning capital movement etc., the state is the only 
source  of  barriers  for  trade  and  economic  (inter-regional)  integration.  In  addition, 
industries’  decisions  concerning  localization  are  also  indirectly  influenced  by  the 
government policy. State intervention is the object of individuals’ anticipations, and it 
consequently changes the behavior of economic agents. If market participants expect a 
change  in  government  policy,  they  will  act  in  order  to  capture  all  the  benefits  and 
minimize the losses arising from that policy. For example, apparent lack of delocalization 
to improve the coordination of production is due to the expected shift of industrial policy. 
Therefore,  far  from  being  an  exogenous  variable,  geographical  disparities  in  the 
production  structure  should  be  considered  as  dependent  on  the  political  institutions 
governing the market process. 
Another  problem,  perhaps  more  relevant  for  those  economists  accepting  an 
innocent view of the state, because it explodes any practical relevance of the Porterian 
theory, arises because of the lack of any independent criteria to establish the proper shape 
of  a  cluster.  The  complementarity  criterion  put  forward  by  the  argument  is  not 
permanent,  but  changes  over  time.
21  Technical  progress  provides  new  methods  of 
combination  among  inputs  and  new  complementarity  patterns  between  production 
processes. Changes in individual preferences cause the relative prices of goods to vary 
permanently and this, in turn, increases or reduces the number of closed substitutes and 
complements for any given good. The concrete specialization of economic units is also 
determined  by  the  actual  array  of  relative  prices.  All  this  makes  the  attempt  to 
                                                            
20 Besides this, Barkley and Henry (1997) discusses several shortcomings of cluster development strategies. 
21  Porter  (1998)  admits  this  explicitly:  “Clusters  continually  evolve  as  new  companies  and  industries 
emerge or decline and as local institutions develop and change.”    17 
circumscribe  economic  clusters  illusory,  because  these  industrial  districts  continually 
change. Therefore, correcting market coordination failures through clusters’ development 
appears more as a recipe for chaos than a serious suggestion for a new industrial policy. 
   
5. Coordination and government intervention 
 
Leaving aside the criticism outlined above, it is interesting to analyze the details 
of development economists’ strategy for government intervention. 
First,  consider  the  importance  many  economists  attach  to  the  evaluation  of 
investment  projects  by  independent  collective  bodies.  It  is  become  a  custom  for 
governments  to  use  boards  of  independent  experts  to  evaluate  the  merits  of  different 
business  plans  competing  for  public  financing.  Since  development  economists  are  so 
optimistic about the quality of such an institutional invention, the natural question that 
arises is: why not extend the “mechanism” to all businesses and investment projects? The 
government could tax away individuals’ income and then redistribute it according to the 
authoritative views of the “panel of experts”. Development economists seem not to notice 
how much their argument can prove. 
One of the merits of the proposed scheme is transparency. Unlike the early vision 
of industrial policy which saw in the policymaker a benevolent social planner, the new 
development economics attempts to incorporate (albeit in an unsatisfactorily manner) the 
public  choice  insights  about  the  nature  of  the  political  process.  It  emphasizes  the 
importance of transparency as a standard for assessing state industrial initiatives. But why 
is transparency so important about government policy? Freezing commodities’ prices or 
wages is a very transparent political measure. Yet at the present, it is far from being 
advocated  by  policymakers,  because  its  harmful  effects  have  become  widely 
understood.
22 This example shows that transparency is not a proper criterion to evaluate 
policy initiatives. 
  Despite their efforts to differentiate their proposal from the older industrial policy, 
the distinctions authors like Porter, Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare introduce are nothing 
                                                            
22 One could argue that government is always tempted to choose the least transparent measures available at 
the moment.   18 
more than rhetorical innovations. As a number of writers have aptly noted,
23 the new sort 
of interventionism amounts to nothing more than picking winners. In a sense, this new 
political  activism  can  incur  even  higher  costs  on  society  than  previous  attempts  to 
engineer  development.  Since  picking  clusters  means  that  policymakers  should  target 
groups  of  companies  or  industries,  rather  than  specific  businesses,  the  magnitude  of 
potential  failures  increases  considerably.  If  government’s  privileges  fail  to  promote 
growth,  than  the  outcome  will  be  not  punctual  bankruptcies  as  in  the  past,  but  the 
occurrence of clusters of losses.
24  
  According  to  Rodrik,  the  policy  of  correcting  coordination  failures  need  not 
consist in subsidization. As he explains, “it is the logic of coordination failures that once 
the simultaneous investments are made all of them end up profitable. Therefore none of 
the investors needs to be subsidized ex post, unless there is an additional reason (i.e., a 
non-pecuniary externality) that such subsidization is required.” What is needed in order 
to  induce  entrepreneurs  to  start  complementary  investments  is  an  “ex-ante  subsidy”, 
consisting for example in a implicit bail-out or an investment guarantee. Put it this way, 
the “new” industrial policy seems to be apparently immune against much of the virus of 
excessive  public  spending,  deficits  and  malinvestment  usually  associated  with 
government activity. But it is still exposed to corruption, rent seeking and moral hazard 
that eventually have the same distorting effect on the production structure. 
  There is still a huge gap between the actual arguments about the necessity of 
solving  coordination  failure  through  government-sponsored  mechanisms  and  the 
requirements these arguments have to fulfill in order to be considered scientifically valid. 
As Beaulier and Subrick (2006) show, development economists have to acknowledge the 
fact that social planners are neither benevolent nor omniscient. However, the free market 
cannot be defended successfully by pointing out that policymakers do not posses enough 
information to allocate resources optimally, or by emphasizing the corruptive nature of 
the state. Perhaps government bureaucrats are both smarter (and better informed) than 
private  entrepreneurs,  and  well  intended.  This  hypothesis  is,  of  course,  completely 
                                                            
23 See, for example, Desrochers and Sautet (2004), Buss (1999a). 
24 Desrochers (2004, p. 239) notes that it is not clear whether cluster-based regional development policy is 
beneficial for the future of these regions, given that “diversified local economies are more stable than   19 
imaginary,  but  it  should  not  be  dismissed  only  because  it  is  empirically  irrelevant. 
Government interventionism has to be criticized granted that policymakers are morally 
and intellectually the best members of society. 
In  spite  of  its  new  clothes,  government  interventionism  has  no  more  solid 
foundation that it ever had. The problem with industrial policy is deeper than most of its 
critics admit. Starting with Mises (1990), a large Austrian literature argued that in the 
absence of private property, money prices cannot emerge and economic calculation is 
impossible. At the limit, in a socialist commonwealth, the central planner has no rational 
way to decide whether to shift resources from project A to project B. Its intervention is 
arbitrary because cannot be subjected to the profit and loss test, as private activities are. 
As  Rothbard  (1962,  p.  825)  observed,  any  puctual  decision  to  socialize  investment 
introduces an island of calculational chaos in the market economy. Promises to bail-out 
entrepreneurs in case they fail to operate profitably, as Rodrik indicates, amount in a de 
facto socialization of private investments. 
The advocates of industrial policy think government can act as private businesses 
do, using the profit and loss criterion to decide between different investment projects. At 
this point, Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 28) believes that, “at least in principle, one could 
calculate  a  social  return for  such  an  investment. With  limited  resources,  the  obvious 
approach would be to invest in the proposals that entail the highest social returns. The 
problem, of course, is that calculating such social returns is very difficult. One (perhaps 
limited) way to interpret prospective studies is as a way to facilitate this calculation.” 
Here, the author (to his own merit) touches the real problem of industrial policy. The 
state is not an entrepreneur, so it is not in position to “interpret” prospective studies the 
same  way  private  individuals  do.
25  More  precisely,  policymakers  cannot  calculate  as 
private entrepreneurs do. Therefore, their decision is merely a “leap into darkness”. 
 
  6. Conclusion 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
highly specialized regions that are more prone to abrupt decline if their main line of business is supplanted 
by competitors located elsewhere or if new and better substitute products are manufactured elsewhere.” 
25 Rather, as Buss (1999b, p. 367) says, “there are only individual or group interests that use public 
authority to their benefit, often at the expense of others.”   20 
  In this paper I have tried to prove that the coordination failure argument does not 
provide a solid ground for a reshaping of the industrial policy both because of its lack of 
sound theoretical foundation, and because of its empirical irrelevance. We have seen that 
at the root of the argument is a misunderstanding of the role of entrepreneurs in industrial 
organization.  Spatial  localization  is  one  dimension  of  the  entrepreneurial  action. 
Although the lack of conceptual precision makes the case for industrial policy appealing, 
coordination and cluster analysis cannot be used to improve the allocation of resources 
above the level reached on a free market. There is no recipe for clusters. Cluster-based 
targeting is so widely practiced not because of scientific merit, but for political reasons. 
Last, but not in the least, the rationale for clustering initiatives fails to address properly 
the information, incentives and calculation problems which plague economic policy in 
general. Thus, numerous pitfalls prevent the “new” industrial policy to be considered a 
refined ingredient of development economics. 
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